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Abstract 
This article examines the role of group dynamics and interactions in explaining economic 
behavior and the evolution of institutions. Our starting point is the large literature on group 
selection in the biological, behavioral and social sciences. We present a range of interpretations 
of group selection, describe a complete set of group selection mechanisms, and discuss the 
empirical and experimental evidence for group selection. Unique features of cultural group 
selection are investigated, and opportunities for applying the latter to various areas of economic 
theory and economic policy are identified. 
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1. Introduction 
Dominant theories in economics, including behavioral economics, are based upon self-
referential individual behavior and neglect the role of groups. As a result, such theories have an 
upward causation perspective. Here it is argued that inclusion of group level phenomena in 
economic analysis is relevant because the presence of groups can change the behavior of 
individuals as well as the interactions among them, and in turn may affect the economic system 
as a whole. The combination of individuals and groups means that upward and downward 
causation operate simultaneously.1 
Our starting point is group selection theory in biology. It addresses the emergence, 
growth and selection of groups, including mergers, takeovers and conflicts between groups. It 
offers arguably the best available framework for thinking about group dynamics and the 
interface between individuals and groups. Various behavioral and social sciences have drawn 
upon the large and growing literature on group selection, which has given rise to the distinction 
between genetic and cultural group selection. This paper examines the application of group 
selection theory to economic behavior and institutions. Combini g individual and group levels 
(or more precisely within-group and between-group processes) in a single analysis results in a 
multilevel approach, which is more complex than a system limited to upward causation of 
processes at the individual level. This additional complexity may partly explain why notions of 
multilevel and group selection have been surrounded by considerable debate. 
Group processes often involve other-regarding decision-making, such as imitation, 
concern for relative position, and social rewards and punishment. Related theories of bounded 
rationality can be considered as complementary to theories of group processes. Recent 
theoretical and experimental findings indeed suggest that groups, norms and social context are 
essential to explanations of individual choice (Akerlof, 2007; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). 
However, the dynamics of, and interaction between, multiple groups is rarely considered in 
theoretical explanations of these empirical studies. 
Including groups and their evolutionary dynamics in models of economic behavior and 
systems may enhance the study of a number of topics relevant to economics in four different 
ways. First, inclusion of groups can clarify the impact they have on cooperation, the structure of 
institutions, and conflicts over economic distribution. Second, it can help to design adequate 
institutions or public regulations for dealing with collective action dilemmas. Indeed, standard 
                                                          
1
 A group is a stable set of individuals having a closer connection (communication, cooperation, sharing, 
helping) with each other than with non-members. The group often is clearly demarcated from non-
members in space, a network or time. A group can be defined as having characteristics that emerge from 
the interactions between individuals. Indicators of this can be average behavior, variance of behavior, 
group size, communication networks, group norms and rules (or more complex institutions), cooperation, 
internal labor division and other aspects of group organization. Firms can be considered as groups, but are 
in economics usually treated as analogous to individuals, certainly when described as part of a larger 
system (such as in a general equilibrium system). 
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public policy solutions to common dilemma type problems are based on models assuming 
purely self-regarding preferences. Such policies may fail to address real world situations 
characterized by group norms influencing individual preferences and interactions (Bowles, 
2008). Third, combining group and individual levels of description allows for the analysis of 
countervailing forces of within- and between-group processes. Finally, group evolution 
illuminates the complex organizational structure of human economies, involving nested 
structures, conflict between groups, and the coevolution of different sets of groups and 
individuals (Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1989; Potts, 2000). 
The combination of evolution and groups means a focus on ultimate, as opposed to 
proximate, explanations. This is increasingly accepted as the most suitable way to understand 
the fundamental nature, history and dynamics of complex systems. Of course, one can simplify 
and assume away dynamics or just pose mechanistic dynamics (i.e. absence of populations, 
diversity, innovation and selection) in any particular analysis, but only an encompassing 
evolutionary framework is able to clarify the margin of error and the conditional range of 
explanation resulting from such a simplification. 
An important basis for thinking about groups is the recently revived debate on group 
selection in biology and the behavioral and social sciences (Bergstrom, 2002; Boyd and 
Richerson, 1990; Field 2001; Henrich, 2004; Sober and Wilson, 1998; Wilson and Hölldobler, 
2005; Wilson and Wilson, 2007; van Veelen and Hopfensitz, 2007). Despite continuing 
disputes, the extensive literature on group selection is now an integral part of the large body of 
evolutionary thinking.2 It makes a subtle distinction between genetic and cultural group 
selection. This reflects the fact that that biological organisms (including humans) make use of 
all kinds of ‘learning mechanisms’, which can be broadly classified into genetic transmission 
and cultural transmission (with epi-genetic and phenotypic plasticity effects as either sub-
categories of these or additional categories). Gintis (2007, 5) refers to this as gene-culture 
coevolution. 
Group selection has received little attention in economics. Rudiments of cultural group 
selection arguments were implicit in Hayek (1976 and later work). He argued that customs, 
morals, laws and other cultural artifacts are subject to group selection, generally surviving and 
replicated if they benefit survival and expansion of the human groups carrying them.3 Others 
have used the term group selection but with a very loose interpretation that does not always 
clearly separate between sociobiology-based kin selection and group selection applied to non-
kin groups (e.g., Samuelson, 1993). They nevertheless seem to support the view that multilevel 
phenomena deserve more attention in economics, which is consistent with, though not identical 
                                                          
2
 It is surprising therefore that in a review of the biological basis of economic behavior Robson (2001, 
2002) did not even mention group selection. 
 
3
 For a critical perspective on Hayek’s view see Steele (1987). 
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to, the vision presented by Potts (2000), who regards economic systems as complex 
“hyperstructures” or nested sets of connections among components. 
Parsimonious modeling, characteristic of both theoretical economics and theoretical 
biology, runs into problems when groups and resulting multilevel phenomena are added to the 
picture. Simple models are unable to adequately address group-related phenomena like 
synergetic interactions among individuals, relative welfare and status seeking, clustering of 
individuals due to spatial isolation, multilevel selection, and the combination of upward and 
downward causation (van den Bergh and Gowdy, 2003). Not surprisingly, one can find many 
different approaches to model group selection (Garcia and van den Bergh, 2007). It is likely that 
some of the results obtained with formal models in the 1960s and 1970s are not as general as 
once thought, because of the limitations of these models. Indeed, at the time, numerical analysis 
with complex, multilevel and spatial models was limited if not impossible. 
In addition to evolutionary theories of group formation and selection, there exist a 
number of less well-defined theories about groups (e.g., Forsyth, 2006). These involve concepts 
like networks and hierarchies, and employ proximate explanations based on psychological, 
sociological, and economic reasoning. In addition, there are experimental studies which 
examine the effects of groups (see Section 4). In mainstream economics fundamental change at 
the level of groups or institutions is usually framed as a rational and deliberate choice among 
options, rather than an endogenous phenomenon as in evolutionary theories (van den Bergh and 
Stagl, 2003). For example, North's (1981) original view was that institutions are “chosen” based 
on efficiency, although later he changed this view dramatically (North, 1997). Institutional 
economics and related work in sociology employ a rich palette of in-depth, historical case 
studies of group phenomena which tend to be more descriptive than analytical and predictive 
(van den Bergh and Stagl, 2003). We believe that evolutionary explanations based on within- 
and between-group selection can offer more fundamental explanations. 
In this paper we show the value of genetic and cultural group selection theory as applied 
to economics. Both genetic and cultural group selection have influenced human nature and 
culture, although cultural group selection is arguably most relevant to current and future social-
economic phenomena. Two notable papers on group selection have been published in economic 
journals, namely Bergstrom (2002) and Henrich (2004). The first of these offered a clear 
exposition of a selected number of formal group selection models, while the second gave an 
impressive and complete (and quite complementary) account of group selection. Other 
“economic papers” on group selection and economics (Bergstrom, 2002; Bowles et al., 2003; 
Choi and Bowles, 2007; Field, 2001, 2008; van Veelen and Hopfensitz, 2007) present a more 
limited approach focusing on specific issues and applications. The remainder of our paper is 
organized as  follows:  
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Section 2 presents a set of alternative definitions and interpretations of group selection, 
preparing the reader for possible confusion about group selection. Section 3 discusses notions 
and theories in biology competing with or otherwise related to group selection, and along the 
way clarifies a number of features of group selection. Among other things, we have tried to 
provide a fair representation and evaluation of the central debate on kin versus group selection. 
Section 4 is an account of the experimental and empirical evidence for (genetic and cultural) 
group selection, within both the natural and social sciences. Section 5 offers a systematic 
account of the mechanisms through which genetic group selection can operate. Section 6 
identifies unique features of cultural group selection as distinguished from genetic group 
selection. Section 7 sketches the implications of (mainly cultural) group selection for various 
areas of theoretical, applied and policy analysis in economics. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. What is group selection? 
To understand the debate on (genetic and cultural) group selection one has to first understand 
the many definitions and interpretations of the phenomenon (Bergstrom, 2002; Field, 2003a, b;  
Gintis, 2000; Henrich, 2004; Sober, 1981; Sober and Wilson, 1998; Soltis et al., 1995; Wilson 
(D.S.), 1975, 2002; Wilson and Sober, 1994): 
• Differential survival and reproduction of groups within a population. Dysfunctional (non-
adapted) groups become extinct and are replaced by relatively successful (well-adapted) 
groups. Here adaptation is to a given environment in which the population resides. Such a 
group evolution process requires a diversity of groups, in terms of composition of 
individuals, genes or strategies or institutions. (This will serve as our working definition 
here.) 
• The frequency of genes (or more precisely alleles) is affected by the benefits and costs they 
bestow on groups. 
• The fitness of every member of a group depends on a common characteristic not isolated in 
an individual. This may be a social institution (‘group meme’). Examples of these are more 
evident in a socio-economic than in a purely biological realm, so that this interpretation 
perhaps better fits cultural rather than genetic group selection. 
• The fitness of every member of a group depends on the behavior of the other individuals in 
the group. In genetic group selection this is made explicit through non-additive genetic 
interaction occurring between individuals within a group (e.g., with regard to altruism or 
aggression). 
• Evolution is combined with functionalism. Group functionality means that ‘the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts’. A particular example in biology is regarding groups as 
superorganisms, as has been common in the case of colonies of social insects (Wilson and 
Hölldobler, 2005). Wilson (2000) refers to this as group-level functionalism. The 
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combination of group evolution and functionalism goes beyond traditional thinking in terms 
of functionalism – notably in sociology – as the latter lacked a dynamic context in terms of 
explaining the mechanisms that give rise to and alter group-level or social functions. 
Functions of groups co-determine fitness and thus sensitivity to selection pressure. 
• Groups function as adaptive units. Group adaptation is realized or improved through 
evolution (diversity and selection) at the level of groups. 
 
The many interpretations of group selection in the literature suggest that the concept has 
many facets and that different authors are not always addressing exactly the same phenomenon. 
Different authors stress different core mechanisms of group selection (see Section 5). In 
addition, while the number of articles providing theoretical arguments, formal models, empirical 
regularities and experimental findings in support of group selection is steadily growing, several 
respected biologists still see fundamental problems with (especially genetic) group selection. 
Others consider it to be theoretically possible but rare and quite unimportant. All this suggests 
that the debate on group selection has not yet converged into a single, agreed-upon theory. Yet it 
is clear that the concept of group selection is now more broadly supported within biology than a 
few decades ago. For example, in an important turnaround, the eminent biologist E.O. Wilson 
now takes the position that genetic group selection acted as the strong binding force in eusocial 
evolution, and that close kinship is likely to be a consequence of eusociality rather than a critical 
factor in its evolution (Wilson and Hölldobler, 2005; Wilson and Wilson, 2007). 
Group selection is often discussed and judged in terms of its application to altruism. 
However, group phenomena can be linked to a variety of social (other-regarding) preferences 
including reciprocity, reciprocal fairness, inequity aversion, pure altruism, altruistic punishment, 
spite, envy and status-seeking (comparison). Second, group selection can address a range of 
genetic or individual interactions, notably cannibalism (especially insects), conflict (fighting) 
and complementary roles (labor division) such as in community selection (Goodnight and 
Stevens, 1997; Swenson et al., 2000). So any genetic or cultural trait might influence within and 
between-group selection, even if the directions of the effects of these are not necessarily 
opposite as in the case of altruism. 
 
3. What economists can learn from the group selection debate 
Natural selection above the level of the individual was a quite acceptable idea to Darwin, 
Wallace and Spencer, all of whom believed in the differential survival of groups. Nevertheless, 
group selection was originally met with skepticism if not outright hostility, partly due to the 
publication of Wynne-Edwards (1962) book Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behavior, 
which was later evaluated as an incorrect statement of group selection and inconsistent with 
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modern formulations of it (Wilson, 1983).4 Wynne-Edwards received strong adverse reactions 
from authorities in biology, notably Williams (1966). Two widely accepted theories countered 
Wynne-Edward’s version of group selection. One was kin selection, the idea that apparent 
altruism is genetically based because altruists are actually protecting their own genes (inclusive 
fitness) by helping close relatives survive (Hamilton, 1964). The other was reciprocal altruism, 
the view that apparent altruism was based on the expectation that favors would be returned 
(Trivers, 1971). These two theories formed the basis of a new field, ‘sociobiology’, which 
initially was opposed to the idea of group selection, arguing that social behavior is entirely the 
result of gene-level and individual-level selection (Ruse, 1979;.Wilson, (E.O.), 1975). 
While the critique of Wynne-Edwards’s version of group selection was correct, it should not 
be misinterpreted as undercutting later, more sophisticated, conceptualizations of group 
selection. Williams’ influential critique contained many misperceptions of group selection, one 
being the averaging fallacy. This means that group selection effects are attributed to individual-
level (i.e. between-individual) selection due to simply calculating the average fitness of 
individuals across groups, rather than decomposing it into average fitness per group and a 
between-group selection component depending on the relative size of groups in the total 
population (Wilson, 1983). The averaging fallacy in fact merely defined group selection away, 
rather than showing it to be incorrect.  
Williams assumed that when a trait is decreasing in frequency in every group, its 
population frequency must also decrease. Surprisingly, this is not necessarily true. The reason is 
differential growth at the group level which causes the composition of the population in terms of 
relative group sizes to change. The net outcome may be that the trait will increase in frequency 
in the overall population. In statistics this is known as Simpson's (1951) paradox. Suppose a 
population consists of two groups, then this paradox requires that the group with relatively 
many individuals with the trait grows relatively fast compared to the groups with relatively few 
individuals with the trait; the proportion in the population of the first group will then increase 
(note that this is a ne essary but not sufficient condition). In mathematical terms this can be 
formulated as follows. Suppose that population size at time t is p(t), the population consists of 
two groups with sizes g1(t) and g2(t), the number of individuals with the trait is a(t), and ai(t) in 
group gi(t) (i=1,2). Then p(t)= g1(t)+ g2(t). Now even if the changes over time in frequencies of 
the trait are characterized for group 1 by a1(t+1)/g1(t+1) < a1(t)/g1(t) and for group 2 by 
a2(t+1)/g2(t+1) < a2(t)/g2(t), then it is still possible that the trait’s frequency in the population 
increases: that is, [a1(t+1)+a2(t+1)]/[g1(t+1)+g2(t+1)] > [a1(t)+a2(t)]/[g1(t)+g2(t)] or 
                                                          
4
 Wilson and Sober (1994) make a distinction between naïve and modern group selection theories. 
Wynne-Edwards (1962) is considered an example of the first as his theory does not account for effects of 
individual selection and essentially assumes that higher level adaptation (even of a single, isolated group) 
is a fact. Modern group (or multilevel) selection theory instead recognizes simultaneous processes of 
individual and group selection, as well as group selection requiring multiple groups. 
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a(t+1)/p(t+1) > a(t)/p(t) holds. To illustrate the numerical possibility: 1/4<2/7 and 5/7<3/4 
while (1+5)/(4+7)=6/11>5/11=(2+3)/(7+4). The example suggests that a rather special case is 
required, which is not surprising, otherwise it would not have been called a paradox. The 
paradox just shows the power of group selection, that in principle it can increase a trait’s 
frequency in a population even if its frequency falls in all groups. The net effects of group 
selection can be much larger if the frequency of traits can also increase in certain groups. The 
latter is the more common or general case of group selection, as will become clear later. 
Especially in the context of altruism, the relationship between kin and group selection 
has been subject to much debate. First, the observed presence of high kin relatedness in a 
population should not be confused, as is often done, with kin selection acting as a crucial factor 
in the historical evolution toward the current system (Griffin and West, 2002). In the context of 
eusociality, it is now considered likely that group selection gave rise to kin selection which in 
turn produced a high degree of relatedness in colonies (Wilson and Hölldobler, 2005). Indeed, 
repeated group selection may increase relatedness in a group, through limited dispersal or 
inbreeding (Hamilton, 1975), thus providing a basis for more effective kin selection. Things get 
even more complex when group and kin selection function in tandem (Aviles et al., 2004). It is 
also often overlooked that the effect of kin selection, such as altruism benefits to kin and thus 
selfish benefits from the shared gene’s perspective, is opposed by competition between kin 
(Frank, 1998). Of course, seemingly altruistic behavior among kin-related individuals can 
simply be the result of direct, reciprocal or general group (i.e. not kin-group specific) benefits 
(Griffin and West, 2002). 
It has been suggested that kin and (certain types of) group selection are conceptually or 
mathematically equivalent. Some have argued that kin selection is a subset of group selection, 
namely when group members are close kin. Indeed, the more general model seems to be group 
selection occurring through assortment (association or clustering of related traits or strategies), 
while kin relatedness can be seen as a special case of such assortment, namely of genetically 
similar individuals. This does, however, not clarify whether group selection is more or less 
useful as a formalized approach to study reality. Possibly, if kin selection is generalized as 
inclusive fitness theory where inclusiveness applies to assorted individuals (or genes), then 
group selection might be (seen as) a special case of it (Grafen, 2007). Foster et al. (2005) stress 
that kin selection does not require family relatedness caused by (recent) common ancestry, but 
only genetic correlation among individuals (including among loci). This seems to come down to 
the same generalized inclusive fitness based on assortment. By stretching the meaning of kin 
selection so much, group and kin selection may indeed coincide. 
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Virtually all authors debating this point assume that group selection always involves 
assortment, and many think that such assortment is only kin based.5 However, group selection 
can operate through other channels than assortment and inclusive fitness. Van Veelen and 
Hopfensitz (2007) and van Veelen (2008) emphasize as an important alternative mechanism a 
shared interest or fate of group members (see Section 5). So the equivalence may hold, but only 
for a subset of group selection models, namely those in which assortative group formation is the 
key mechanism. The model-based literature shows that formalization of groups generally results 
in quite different mathematical formulations than those based on of kin selection, and they are 
not necessarily reducible to one another. Moreover, they may employ different types of specific 
assumptions and as a result they can differ in accuracy of describing organisms and their 
evolution (Queller, 1992). Nevertheless, the similarity between Hamilton’s rule and rules arising 
from group selection has been shown for certain types of group selection models (e.g., Frank, 
1997; Grafen, 2007; Lehmann et al., 2007, Ohtsuki et al., 2006). The distinction in practice 
between group and kin selection as a causal mechanism may ultimately depend on the type of 
data gathered, as has been argued by various authors (Colwell, 1981; Griffin and West, 2002). 
 Wilson (1983) notes that whereas kin selection emphasizes inclusive fitness and the 
impact of altruism on other individuals, group selection emphasizes relative fitness in groups 
and impact of altruism on the (relative) productivity of the group. They are different ways to 
understand processes that are similar when groups are defined as consisting of close kin. 
Moreover, group selection can operate when group members are not each other’s kin. Kin 
selection has also been invoked to explain altruistic acts, in this case among strangers in large 
human groups. The reasoning is that since humans evolved in groups with close kin 
relationships they are accustomed (programmed) to act to a certain degree altruistically. 
Moreover, people are supposed to possess an imperfect psychological capacity to distinguish 
kin from non-kin, or altruists from defectors. Such kin-type of behavior is easily extended to 
non-kin in larger groups in modern societies. Henrich (2004), however, provides several 
empirical arguments against this reasoning: individuals clearly distinguish between close from 
distant relatives, have frequent encounters with strangers, and do not cooperate to the same 
degree with all group members.  
Reciprocal altruism refers to behavior based on the expectation that favors will be 
returned. This requires a certain minimum level of cognition. Reciprocal interaction has been 
invoked to explain altruistic acts toward strangers. The main problem raised by this is that 
reciprocity requires repeated interaction or trust that an altruistic act will be reciprocated. 
                                                          
5
 Grafen (1984, p.83) states that group selection theory is worthwhile if genetic similarity is the result of 
kinship and if populations have a clear group structure. But then group selection will immediately come 
down to inclusive fitness calculation. About “preferential assortment” he (p. 79) suggests that “… the 
only plausible cause of genetic similarity among group members is common ancestry…” because “It is 
unlikely that the locus for altruism is closely linked to the loci for habitat preference.” 
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However, if individuals are strangers neither condition is satisfied. The more credible 
explanation for generalized reciprocity as the basis of altruism in large groups is that it is an 
extension of evolved reciprocity in small groups consisting of individuals familiar with each 
other. Extended or indirect reciprocity, based on information of previous interactions with 
others, reflected in judgment of reputation and morality and involving trust, is apparently 
present in some animal as well as human societies. In humans it has led to complex social 
interactions with correlated demands on individual cognitive capacities (Nowak and Sigmund, 
2005). Indirect reciprocity, however, can not serve as an ultimate explanation of human 
prosocial behavior, as this requires the “big mistake” hypothesis, which says that humans cannot 
differentiate between acquaintances and strangers, or at least do not treat them differently. But 
this hypothesis is refuted by various experiments (Henrich, 2004). This does not deny that both 
experimental and empirical studies indicate that individuals show altruism towards strangers in 
one-shot games (Fehr and Gachter, 2002). In addition, it should be noted that indirect 
reciprocity cannot solve the n-person dilemma (note that most published models are 2 person 
models). The reason is that it gives rise to multiple stable equilibria (Panchanthan and Boyd, 
2005), so that it requires an equilibrium selection mechanism (with group selection as one 
candidate). In other words, group selection and indirect reciprocity are not alternatives (Henrich 
et al., 2006; Henrich and Henrich, 2007). 
According to the biologist Alexander (1987), the evolution of ethics received a major 
stimulus from the long history of violent interactions among ancestral primate groups, and in 
line with this was aimed at strengthening the structure of the own group. This is supported by 
asymmetric behavior in conflicts among (living) apes and monkeys: conflict resolving inside the 
group, and extreme brutality to outsiders. Similarly, humans apply ethics asymmetrically to 
insiders and outsiders of the group they belong to. The most convincing examples of this are 
wars and religious and ethnic conflicts (de Waal, 1996, 29; Wilson, 2002). In a recent study, 
Choi and Bowles (2007) invoke a group selection model to show that group conflict between 
humans may be closely related to the evolution of parochial altruism (see also Garcia and van 
den Bergh, 2008). The latter has two faces, namely providing benefits to fellow group members 
and showing hostility towards outsiders, both at a personal cost. Field (2008, 210) phrases it as: 
“I acknowledge that our ability to make common cause has a dark side: the control of within 
group conflict sometimes lays the foundation for violent attacks on outgroups. But the 
inclination is also what brings millions of people to the polls in democratic nations and is as 
much an underpinning of democracy as it is of dictatorship”. 
Group competition and selection, together with reciprocal altruism, are considered by 
de Waal to be the set of essential building blocks of the evolution of morality. On a 
psychological level, the crucial change and stepping stone from non-moral animals to moral 
humans is the evolution of perceptions and empathy, that is, the ability to be affected by feelings 
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of another organism or the situation in which it finds itself (more basic and neutral than 
sympathy). Empathy goes along with self-awareness, i.e. distinguishing oneself clearly from the 
environment or the rest of the world, and with perception, i.e. positioning oneself in different 
roles or individuals to understand a situation or problem. These lead to the moral community, in 
which not only direct, one-to-one interactions occur among individuals but also indirect ones: 
care about good relationships between others, and mediation and arbitration in conflicts. De 
Waal (1996, 34) calls this “community concern”. Humans add to these mechanisms of 
punishment and reward explicitly focused at maintaining or improving the social environment, 
sometimes referred to as meta-norms (see Axelrod, 1986). Altruistic punishment leads to 
internalization of norms and rules and guilt-like behavior, common in humans and other 
primates, as well as in dogs. For the cases of group selection where empathy is involved, a 
minimum level of intelligence of individuals may be required. On the other hand, stable norms 
exist that reflect a complete lack of empathy (let alone sympathy), such as female circumcision 
in various human cultures and religions. 
Wilson (2005) regards the distinction between absolute and relative fitness as essential 
to understanding the impact of group selection. By increasing the absolute fitness of individuals 
within a single, isolated group (or population) to the same degree, their relative fitness does not 
alter, so that the fitness change will be without evolutionary consequences. But when adding 
other groups that interact (perhaps depending on the same scarce resources), the absolute change 
in fitness for the original individuals will mean an improved average fitness of the group 
relative to that of other groups. Then the group may grow more quickly than other groups and 
thus will increase its proportion in the total population. The effect of this is only interesting if 
fitness differences between groups relate to diversity in the structural (genetic or cultural) basis 
of groups (i.e. their individuals). Wilson notes that explanations based on individual-level 
selection tend to neglect the possibility of group selection effects because they focus on absolute 
instead of relative fitness improvements. He notes that by changing strategy individuals may 
reduce their relative fitness even if they improve their absolute fitness, simply because the group 
as a whole benefits from their change of strategy, as in the case of altruistic acts. The problem is 
that the identification of individual-level selection with absolute fitness improvement frustrates 
the search for decomposing evolutionary change into within- and between-group selection 
contributions. At a more general level, using the wrong indicators may obscure satisfactory 
explanations of complex phenomena. 
The most common argument against group selection is free rider behavior. The idea is 
that free riders will profit from the benefits of being part of a group with genuine altruism and 
social institutions, without contributing to these or contributing less than average. As the 
relative proportion of free riders in the group increases, the benefits for the group will slowly 
disappear. Moreover, it is relatively easy to be altruistic when resource scarcity and competition 
Page 13 of 44
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 12
are low, but selection pressure is then quite low as well, so that this altruistic behavior will not 
quickly diffuse. On the other hand, altruism and altruistic punishment are less common when 
scarcity and competition are high, that is, when altruism implies a serious sacrifice. Because 
selective pressure is higher in the second case, individual-level selection will generally have a 
relatively larger impact. A major shortcoming of this reasoning is that it employs a single level 
explanation  that excludes group variation and group selection. The latter allows groups with 
relatively many altruists to grow faster than other groups, as a result of which the proportion of 
altruists in the population as a whole may increase. This is the above mentioned Simpson’s 
paradox. Moreover, group rewards to altruistic punishment are higher when resources are 
scarce. In addition, the reasoning is restricted to altruism and free riding, whereas group 
selection has a broader significance. 
The conclusion is that evolutionary dynamics may be seen as resulting from a 
combination of within- and between-group selection, irrespective of how weak each force is in a 
species, system or certain period of time. This insight was formalized in the well-known Price 
(1970, 1972) equation which allows a decomposition of evolutionary changes into between-
group and within-group effects.6 This should, however, not be considered as proof of the 
theoretical possibility or empirical effectiveness of group selection in real world contexts.7 
Henrich (2004) uses the Price equation to derive a set of necessary conditions for group 
selection to be effective. Ceteris paribus, the larger the variation between groups, the more 
opportunity for between-group selection to be effective and dominate the within-group selection 
effects. Variation between groups is nevertheless hampered by migration, mixing and 
reformation of groups, which will receive attention later on. 
 
4. Experimental and empirical evidence for biological and cultural group selection 
Evidence for group selection comes from various sources. It comes from “artificial” selection in 
experiments and empirically-oriented studies using adaptationist analysis, as well as selection in 
non-human nature (animals, plants, communities and ecosystems) and in humans. 
                                                          
6
 A version of the Price equation was published more than fifty years ago by Crow (1955) as a multi-level 
extension of Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection. In an interesting commentary on the 
Price equation Crow (2004) points out that the first person to use covariances rather than variances was 
Robertson (1966) who extended Fisher’s Theorem to traits other than fitness. According to Crow (2004) 
“Put these two together and you have Price’s equation.” 
 
7
 The generality of the Price decomposition is further supported by the fact that Hamilton (1975) used it to 
reformulate his theory of inclusive fitness in group selection terms. This led him to conclude that the 
inclusive fitness approach to social behavior is more general than group selection, as the latter depends on 
a group structure whereas the first can also address ungrouped populations. Generality in this sense, 
however, does not mean that group selection is not useful or cannot generate additional, unique insights. 
Moreover, as previously discussed  in this section, such a generalization applies only to one type of group 
selection, which functions mainly through assortment. 
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Based on various experimental studies, Goodnight and Stevens (1997, 62) conclude that 
genetic group selection can be very effective in influencing genetic and phenotypic change over 
time. They find that group selection differs from individual-level selection in that it can 
influence interactions between individuals that are neglected in models only describing 
individual-level selection as well as in experiments allowing only for artificial individual-level 
selection. In defense of this statement they refer to 11 experimental studies between 1977 and 
1996, on beetles (various cases), domestic rat (group selection through male cooperation in 
mating), plants (leaf area), and chicken (interaction between egg production and aggression).  
Wade (1976) undertook experiments with beetles (Tribolium castaneum) and found 
significant group selection effects. Selection in these experiments focused on size of groups and 
was artificial. In only a few generations the group selection effects were very evident. In this 
case the concrete influence was altered rates of cannibalism. Wilson (1983), evaluating these 
experiments, notes that group size regulation can occur by cannibalism (selfish behavior) and 
voluntary birth control (altruistic). He argues that if selfish and altruistic strategies are both 
present, then group selection will foster the selfish strategy. This is surprising and contrasts with 
most of the literature critical of group selection, since it is almost taken for granted here that 
selfish strategies do not require group selection. Instead, it is generally believed that group 
selection only may need to be invoked to explain widespread altruism. 
A surprising experimental finding is the group selection effects assessed in experiments 
with chicken egg production. Whereas artificial individual-level selection may maximize egg 
production for isolated chickens, group selection arranges a trade-off between productivity and 
aggression, which is relevant if chickens are to be housed in multiple-hen cages (“egg 
factories”) characterized by aggressive interaction. Group selection realized a 160% increase in 
group yield or group-average egg production versus unselected controls, and likewise less 
aggression. The economic value of this result is evident: not only more egg production but also 
reduced hen mortality and less need for beak trimming (Muir, 1996). 
The impact of group selection on plants is also surprising. Experimental results for 
groups covering low and high leaf area showed between-group selection to be more effective 
than between-individual selection (Goodnight and Stevens, 1997). Group selection theory has 
even been shown to apply to communities, i.e. involving interactions between individuals or 
populations of multiple species, resulting in community or ecosystem selection theory. This has 
also been confirmed by experiments (Goodnight, 1990a 1990b, 2000; Goodnight and Stevens, 
1997; Swenson et al., 2000). 
A necessary proviso of experimental findings supporting the potential effectiveness of 
group selection is that the artificial nature of selection likely means that effects will generally be 
stronger than when occurring under natural conditions. The more so since many experiments 
Page 15 of 44
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 14
employ the propagule model (see Section 5). Nevertheless, the experiments support the 
direction and potential effectiveness of group selection as an evolutionary force. 
To obtain a more complete picture other evidence is relevant. Empirically-oriented 
studies using adaptationist analysis are reported by Wilson (1983). He mentions a commonly 
cited example of group selection, namely the evolution of avirulence in a myxoma virus that 
was introduced into Australia to control the European rabbit. Each rabbit is a deme from the 
standpoint of the virus, so that the structured deme model of group selection can be applied. 
When a rabbit dies the associated virus group becomes extinct, as the virus cannot survive in a 
dead rabbit and mosquitoes necessary for diffusion do not bite dead rabbits. The virus groups 
that are alive are the least virulent. Therefore, even though avirulence has no selective 
advantage within a virus group, it arises through deme or group selection. 
Goodnight and Stevens (1997) summarize field studies of group selection under natural 
conditions. They list five studies between 1989 and 1996, all of which supported the 
effectiveness of group selection. The studies deal with a number of traits and species, namely 
cannibalism in beetles, survivorship, flower production and fruit production in plants, and 
reproductive and worker allocation in ants. Some of these studies use ‘contextual analysis’ 
based on traits like population density and percentage ground cover, and group fitness indicators 
such as mean leaf area, mean plant height, and mean photosynthetic rate. 
Another example of group selection under natural conditions often mentioned in the 
literature is biased sex ratios. Williams (1966) showed that under certain assumptions 
individual-level selection would give rise to an even sex ratio while group selection would lead 
to a female-biased sex ratio. The absence of such biased sex ratios in nature he regarded as 
evidence against group selection. However, later female-biased sex ratios have been assessed in 
hundreds of species, which is a very possible result of equilibrium between opposing forces of 
within- and between-group selection (Colwell, 1981; Frank, 1986). 
With regard to social insects, Wilson and Hölldobler (2005) argue that genetic group 
selection needs to be invoked to offer a complete explanation of the evolution of eusociality. 
They regard close kinship likely to be a consequence of eusociality rather than a critical factor 
in its evolution. They think that only group selection is able to provide a consistent explanation 
for two central empirical facts: the rareness of eusociality and the ecological dominance of 
eusocial insects over solitary and pre-eusocial competitors. In particular, evolution of 
eusociality had to involve two phases of group selection: initially competition between solitary 
individuals and cooperative pre-eusocial groups, and later on competition between colonies, 
groups with strong cooperation and close genetic relatedness. Group selection is able to counter 
the dissolutive effects of selfish individual behavior, giving a chance for kin selection to 
emerge. Comparison of the history of insects with and without eusociality yields some insights 
about preconditions for eusociality to evolve, namely individual preadaptations such as building 
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nests and feeding larvae, both of which foster cooperation within groups. Moreover, the key 
adaptation of eusocial species is defense against all sorts of enemies in which groups are better 
than individuals (Wilson and Hölldobler, 2007). It is long established that more advanced 
eusocial species are characterized by more labor division and subtle, chemical communication, 
which makes groups function more effectively in reproduction, conflicts and foraging.   
Support for genetic and cultural group selection in humans evidently cannot make use 
of artificial experiments. Instead, evidence here takes a more indirect form, as discussed in 
Boyd et al. (2003) and Henrich (2004). Wilson’s (2002) group-selection explanation of religions 
offers one of the best arguments for the relevance of cultural group selection for the social 
sciences. He shows that there always has been a large diversity of religions, that religious 
groups are quite stable (existing for many human generations), that they compete and enter in 
violent conflicts (even within single ‘meta-religions’ like Christianity and Islam), that they bind 
groups very strongly through fear and punishment, and that they reproduce very well 
(propagation mechanisms include indoctrination of children, rules about partners and offspring, 
and active efforts to convert non-believers). Moreover, the suggestion that the most powerful 
and impressive god is a solitary god may have helped monotheist religions to become dominant 
in the world. Note that the evolution of religions is relevant to economics, as religions provide 
institutions and rules with important economic repercussions (Iannaccone, 1999). Landa (2008) 
generalizes the idea of selection of religious groups to “homogeneous middleman groups” 
supported by many historical examples of merchants/traders. 
With regard to non-religious institutions, Gürerk et al. (2006) show experimentally that 
a sanctioning institution comes out as the winner when competing with a sanction-free 
institution. In Gürerk et al.’s experiments, despite initial aversion, the entire population 
ultimately chooses the sanctioning institution. This indicates the relevance of institutional 
selection for collective action. 
The evidence coming from primate research is mixed. Some of it underpins the 
relevance of groups in behavior and evolution. Silk et al. (2003) show that infants of more social 
female baboons have a greater chance of surviving to the first birthday. Melis et al. (2006) find 
that chimpanzees recognize when collaboration is useful or necessary and know how to select 
among non-kin the best collaborative partners. These authors argue that since such skills are 
shared with humans, they may have characterized a common ancestor. However, in several 
chimpanzee experiments chimps act like Homo economicus (Silk et al., 2005). In addition, de 
Waal (2006, 16) notes that in primate species males or females often leave the group and join 
neighboring groups. This suggests genetic isolation is imperfect and group selection effects are 
weakened. One should be careful, however, not to jump to the conclusion that such effects are 
entirely absent, as genetic differences between groups will not necessarily disappear completely.  
Page 17 of 44
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 16
Many reputable biologists have expressed the view that genetic and cultural group 
selection has likely played a role in the evolution of humans, even if they question the relevance 
for animals (plants are surprisingly neglected). In addition, indirect experimental evidence is 
available. In psychology group experiments have been performed and contrasted with similar 
experiments with isolated individuals (Bornstein and Ben-Yossef, 1994). Although not strictly 
about evolution, these studies make clear that interactions between individuals affect individual 
strategies. Competition among groups turns out to be of influence on group outcomes. Even the 
awareness of another group makes a difference in terms of individual play. Because of a lack of 
space, we abstain from mentioning further examples from psychology that indirectly support the 
relevance of group selection. 
In spite of the documented experimental and empirical evidence, one may wonder why 
attribution of experimental or empirical findings to group selection is still rare compared to 
individual-level selection. Wilson (2005) convincingly argues that this is largely due to ignoring 
the difference between absolute and relative fitness (Section 3). Typically, researchers do not 
distinguish between group and individual-level selection effects on fitness but immediately 
calculate net effects and then automatically attributes these to individual-level selection. 
 
5. Mechanisms of group selection 
In this section we provide a set of mechanisms of genetic group selection. As some of these also 
apply to cultural group selection, understanding them can clarify how group selection might 
function in economic settings. Some of the mechanisms are necessary for group selection to 
occur while others merely make it more likely or more effective. Not surprisingly, the lack of 
attention to important factors in early analyses explains why past researchers have often 
dismissed the possibility or effectiveness of group selection. The following factors are 
considered here: (1) migrant pool versus so-called propagule type of population dynamics 
(relating to group formation), (2) (non-random) assortment, (3) (1) type of population structure 
(spatial, behavioral), (5) institutions, (6) splitting of groups, (7) group conflict, and (8) non-
additive (genetic) interaction between individuals. Some of these factors have received more 
attention in modeling than others. No model captures all of them, so that there really is no 
general or complete model of group selection. In fact, a systematic combination of all possible 
assumptions relating to these factors is missing in the literature on formal modeling of group 
selection (Garcia and van den Bergh, 2007). 
Whereas individuals are concrete, stable entities, groups are more vague and fluid, 
which raises the question of how groups come into existence. Groups can originate through 
random isolation, inbreeding, ecological specialization or non-random assorting. Slatkin and 
Wade (1978) noted two alternative approaches to describe the colonization of areas (habitats) 
referred to as migrant pool and propagule models. In the migrant pool model all populations 
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contribute migrants to a common pool from which colonists are drawn at random to occupy 
areas, so that there is complete mixing of individuals from different populations. The haystack 
model by Maynard Smith (1964) is a well-known example. In the propagule model a pool is 
made up of individuals derived from a single population so that there is no mixing of individuals 
from different populations. Through cumulative mutations in, and selection of, genetic or 
cultural characteristics, much more among-group diversity can be realized, and in turn group 
selection can be much more effective. Seen another way, in comparison with the propagule 
approach, the migrant pool model means that something which might be termed ‘group 
heritability’ or group reproduction – a core element of any evolutionary system – is largely 
absent, suggesting that group evolution will be incomplete and thus ineffective or even non-
existent. However, this may not be the case if group conflict is introduced (see below). Finally, 
repeated group selection in a propagule type framework with isolated small groups sensitive to 
drift can produce increasing kin relatedness and ultimately give rise to speciation.8 
An important cause of group formation and selection is non-random, assortative 
interaction, which can be opposed to randomly remixing groups. Special cases are preferential 
assorting and common ancestry (kin selection). Assortative interactions lead to nonrandom 
variation among groups. This mechanism is operative, for instance, if altruists are able to 
recognize other altruists. This works in any case within the context of extended families and 
small groups, and for larger groups if individuals satisfy a minimal degree of cognitive abilities 
or (social) intelligence in combination with experience (learning). Random variation in small 
groups can produce outcomes that resemble non-random assorting, which is often referred to as 
genetic or cultural drift. Assorting can also occur through kin-recognition resulting in extended 
family groups, in which case group selection is equivalent to kin selection (Hamilton, 1964). In 
biological contexts inbreeding is an important case of assortative grouping according to kin 
features. Other results can be obtained for different assorting rules. Bergstrom (2003) offers a 
generalized account based on an “index of assortativity”. He explains the evolution of 
cooperation under assorting as the cost of cooperating being compensated by higher 
probabilities and associated higher benefits of meeting a cooperating partner. In an economic 
context assortative grouping will depend on group-specific institutions that promote cooperation 
and altruism, such as education, religion, political voting systems and free press. 
                                                          
8
 Traulsen and Nowak (2006) provide a model of group splitting. It allows only for interaction between 
individuals within strictly separated groups. Groups split endogenously when (successful) groups reach a 
certain maximum size, while another group is eliminated so as to keep the total number of groups 
constant. This can be seen as a special type of propagule pool model. It is applied to prisoners dilemma 
games between cooperators and defectors, and a fundamental condition for the evolution of cooperation is 
b/c>1+n/m, with b and c denoting the benefit and cost of an altruistic or cooperative act, respectively, and 
n and m the maximum group size (where probabilistically splitting occurs) and the number of groups. 
With smaller maximum group size or with more groups, the condition is more easily satisfied and 
cooperation is favored by multilevel selection. A modified formula is derived for the case including 
migration, which weakens the effect of group selection. 
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 Assortative interaction depends on the effectiveness with which individuals recognize 
others with similar characteristics. This problem is often formalized through signaling games. In 
a biological sense this can depend on chemical signals (kin selection - e.g., ants). In a cultural 
setting it can involve location of meeting (public space - bar, political party), expression of ones 
convictions (verbally, through physical appearance - e.g., clothing style). In order to be stable, 
this requires a constraint on, or complete lack of, mutations. The ‘green beard effect’ as a 
special case of ‘signalling’ is relevant here (Dawkins, 1976; Henrich, 2004). Suppose altruists 
have green beards which allow them to recognize and cooperate with each other; but due to 
mutation selfish individuals also start to grow green beards. The result is a steady increase of the 
proportion of selfish individuals in the population. This is a special case of free riding behavior 
as discussed earlier, but based on reaction to signals. The effectiveness of assortative grouping 
in creating a sustainable 'altruistic group' depends on the relative forces of assortative interaction 
and mutations in defectors that allow them to send out fake signals. If the first dominates, 
altruism can survive; if the second dominates, altruistic behavior is unsustainable and driven out 
by selfishness. In general, altruism can be sustained only if signaling and assorting is cheaper 
for altruists than is faking the signal for selfish individuals (Henrich, 2004). 
 Pepper and Smuts (2000, 2002) argue that the existence of spatial or patchy 
environments provides a sufficient basis for group selection, and that there is no need for ex 
ante, stable discrete groups. They also present an explicitly spatial model in which nonrandom 
assortment occurs through individuals reacting to local environments by migrating in such a 
way that those with similar traits end up relatively more abundant in a new locality. The result is 
that environments are positively correlated with individual traits. Environmental change, such as 
environmental degradation or increasing resource scarcity, may induce individual responses that 
stimulate assortment. Pepper and Smuts work can be linked to the growing literature on local 
interaction evolutionary (multi-agent) models. Here agents perceive costs or benefits that 
depend on strategies by other agents in their immediate environment. For example, punishing or 
being punished can both be associated with a cost that depends on how many defectors or 
enforcers exist in the local environment of an agent (Bergstrom and Stark, 2003; Eshel et al., 
1998, 1999; Nowak and Sigmund, 2000). These studies illustrate the general case that a change 
at a higher level (a group) alters the rules (cost and benefits, or fitness logic) at the lower level 
of individual agents. In such models the survival of a certain agent or strategy depends on the 
local population environment, which can be interpreted as a case of the general intrademic or 
trait group selection model. Trait here refers to features of individuals affecting the fitness of 
other individuals in the group (genetic interaction). Eshel et al. (1998) show that in a world with 
local interactions between altruists and egoists, altruism is a strictly dominated strategy, but 
altruists can survive as long as they are grouped together and push up each others performance. 
For example, Noailly et al. (2009) show that local equilibria consist of a protection layer of 
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enforcers. In view of the foregoing it is surprising that the literature on local interactions with 
evolutionary agent-based modeling does not make reference to group selection. Integrating 
these literatures offers a fruitful research direction. 
 The traditional method to study these issues, systems of dynamic equations such as 
theoretical population models and evolutionary game theory, cannot address multilevel selection 
based on local interactions and spatial heterogeneity of environment and populations (Pepper 
and Smuts, 2000). The traditional theoretical approach makes simplifying assumptions, 
consistent with the principle of parsimony (Williams, 1966), which may be wholly unsuitable 
for the analysis of group selection. Possible oversimplifying assumptions include homogenous 
populations, fixed split-up of groups and infinite population sizes. Most fundamental is that the 
groups are exogenous and fixed, whereas in more realistic spatial, local-interaction or agent-
based evolutionary models groups are endogenous while boundaries between groups change. 
The neglect of these features partly explains why many theoreticians in biology have 
insufficiently recognized the relevance of group selection. This is all the more surprising given 
that the crucial role of space for speciation was clearly recognized by the founders of modern 
evolutionary biology, Darwin and Wallace, and was elaborated in the theory of island 
biogeography (MacArthur and Wilson, 1967). 
Bowles and Gintis (1998) regard the spatial dimension as important to address four 
mechanisms employed by communities to solve coordination problems: (1) reputation (low cost 
information about other agents needed), (2) retaliation (frequent or long-lasting interactions 
needed), (3) segmentation (non-random pairing of social agents), and (4) parochialism (limited 
migration among groups required). The latter two imply spatial disaggregation of the analysis as 
a special type of what the authors call “structured populations”. At a general level, group 
selection can be seen as the outcome of a spatial game characterized by local interactions, in 
which groups emerge as (to some extent) spatially isolated units. This model favors the 
emergence of unique local equilibria causing group diversity at the global scale. In this context 
the common typology of speciation - the emergence of a new species - is clarifying: allopatric 
speciation denotes the case in which one species splits into two species due to (spatial) 
separation; sympatric speciation occurs without spatial isolation (difficult because of 
interbreeding); peripatric speciation occurs in meta-populations at the edge of (large) 
populations living in vast areas; and parapatric speciation occurs in continuous populations 
living in vast areas where subpopulations are subject to different selection environments. All 
these types of speciation require group formation (starting with meta-populations), in different 
ways. 
Van Veelen and Hopfensitz (2007) suggest that the most important distinction between 
group selection models of altruism is in fact between “standard models” in which assortative 
group formation is the key to group selection, and models in which the interest or fate of group 
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members is aligned or shared. The first type of model is close to kin selection models, since 
here assortment is due to kin relatedness. Assortment causes altruists to interact relatively much 
with other altruists, giving a selective advantage. Assortment requires a propagule pool 
structure. The main (or perhaps only) example of the second type of model is group conflict, as 
the fate of individuals in winning or loosing groups are perfectly aligned. Assortment is not 
required here, and group selection due to group conflict might even leave an impact with a 
migrant pool structure (i.e. random remixing of groups in each period). Although the proposed 
distinction might not serve as a disjunct classification (as the group selection types are 
complementary rather than exclusive) it touches upon key factors and processes (and possibly 
even necessary conditions) underlying group selection (see also van Veelen, 2008). In 
particular, it clears up some confusion about kin selection versus group selection: kin selection 
is a special case of the first type of model, but it has no relation to the second. It is not unlikely 
that groups are generally more competitive and prone to conflict than individuals, because of a 
sharp in/outgroup distinction (parochialism).  
The distinction between group selection by assortment a d shared fate bears a relation 
with Boyd and Richerson’s (1990) discussion of multiple stable equilibria (MSE). The ‘shared 
fate model’ is just one way to get MSE. Boyd and Richerson show that in systems with 
evolution of social behavior that have more than one evolutionarily stable strategy (such as 
coordination, reciprocity and sexual selection games) selection among groups can cause the 
spread of the strategy that is most likely to contribute to the formation of new groups. A 
condition for this is that processes increasing the frequency of successful strategies within 
groups, like behavioral variation through cultural acquiring, need to be strong relative to inter-
group migration. Henrich and Boyd (2001) show that inclusion of competing, realistic strategies 
of cultural transmission (namely, copying the most successful individual and copying the most 
frequent behavior) in a cooperative dilemma generates a MSE problem at the multi-group level. 
Cultural group selection acting upon this can generate a unique equilibrium for the population. 
Avilés (2002) introduces a new element into the group selection literature. She 
distinguishes between cooperation (or altruism) and “groupishness”. This allows her to trace the 
‘coevolution’ of the two characteristics of individuals. Groupishness is taken to mean that 
individuals are prone to join larger groups. In addition, it is assumed that group size influences 
the fitness of individuals. A main finding is that freeloaders – groupish non-cooperators or free 
riders – increase in frequency in the population if they are rare, but are selected against beyond a 
threshold frequency because of a reduced productivity of the groups that host them. The result is 
periodic cycles in the population composition. Related to this is the recent work on “identity 
economics.” Akerlof and Kranton (2000) use a utility maximizing model to examine the 
psychological basis of self identity. Davis (2007) provides a convincing critique of this model 
from the point of view of social psychology.  He argues that treating identity merely as an 
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argument in a neoclassical utility function does not address the question of how social identities 
are related. 
Finally, group selection is more effective in the presence of non-additive (genetic) 
interaction between individuals (in a group) or non-linear cultural interaction between 
individuals (institutions) (Goodnight and Stevens, 1997). This may take various forms, such as 
genetic interaction within (epistasis) or between individuals. Cultural interactions may occur 
between individuals or within an individual, when the synthesis of different cultural elements 
(culturgens, memes) determines the cultural fitness of that individual.9 Such cultural interaction 
can result in an increase in group differences, a necessary basis for group selection to work 
upon. Unlike additive interaction (or independence of individuals), non-additive (or non-linear) 
interaction allows for a larger effect of group selection compared to individual selection. The 
reason is that the latter type of interaction means that there will be less similarity between 
individuals in different generations (parent and offspring). Individual-level selection then 
typically will be weaker. Moreover, group selection can influence or control the interactions 
between individuals, since it operates at the higher level which includes the interactions, so it 
can select among these. Individual selection cannot do this by definition, as it works at the level 
below the group (i.e. the level of individual interactions). It is worth noting that many of the 
traditional writings on group selection – including those using simple models – neglect gene 
interaction and focus only on single genes or assume additive gene effects. Despite its empirical 
relevance, this issue seems not to have received sufficient attention in discussions of cultural 
group selection. 
We have presented many mechanisms and factors that may influence the feasibility and 
effectiveness of group selection. By way of summary, Table 1 contains some of the insights 
about group selection mechanisms, which may be inspiring to economic applications. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
6. Cultural group selection 
Although the foregoing section was not restricted to group selection in biological species, it is 
useful to consider group selection in relation to human social groups in more detail and identify 
distinctive mechanisms and factors. Cultural group selection pertains to socio-economic human 
systems, without any specific direct role played by genetic diversity and associated mechanisms, 
                                                          
9
 This aspect of interaction of genes or individuals has been generalized through the notion of social 
heterosis. This means that synergetic effects or fitness benefits arise in groups as a result of interactions 
between genetically diverse individuals (Nonacs and Kapheim, 2007). In particular, groups can include 
phenotypic expressions through multiple individuals that cannot be combined in single individuals. This 
suggests a functionality of groups that is not simply the sum of the individuals. From an economic 
perspective, one could interpret this as complementary specialization or labor division, which may work 
to the benefit of all group members. 
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but instead cultural evolution being driven by structural cultural variants and transmission 
mechanisms. The evolution of group-unique social norms reinforced by systems of rewards and 
punishment, prestige-based and conformist imitation, and assortative interaction (group 
formation) are important elements of cultural group selection. Next to historical genetic and 
cultural group selection being responsible for current features of human society, it is likely that 
cultural group selection affects socio-economic changes in our time. 
Group selection acting upon humans operates according to two broad categories of 
mechanisms, namely differential population growth of groups (genetic group selection) and 
cultural transmission (cultural group selection). For example, the historical diffusion of early 
agriculture may be attributed to both general mechanisms, where the relative contribution of 
each may have varied over time. Of course, cultural transmission and differential population 
growth can also join forces, as when groups merge or one group takes over another, or even 
interact (coevolution). In this case, some ‘rearrangement’ of behaviors and cultural habits will 
occur, for example, where one group will be dominant. Steele (1987) mentions a kind of reverse 
‘law’ suggested by Marx, namely that conquest more often leads to adoption of the culture of 
the conquered than of the conqueror. Differential population growth is based on the group 
differences in the net effect of birth and death rates, and includes as specific mechanisms 
intergroup competition (successful groups replace less successful ones through multiplication), 
intergroup conflict (possibly with extinction), and differential population growth through 
reproductive success or “demographic swamping,” (see Henrich, 2004). 
Cultural transmission involves various mechanisms typically studied in social 
psychology, such as conformist and prestige-based transmission, following norms, and 
punishing non-conformists or norm-violators (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Richerson and Boyd, 
2005). Cultural transmission based on the advanced cognitive and cooperative capabilities of 
humans make group selection in humans possibly more pronounced than in other animals. This 
is reinforced by the fact that human intelligence enhances group formation, through recognizing 
like-minded individuals (assorting), coordinating actions (agreeing upon rules and standards), 
and organizing complex labor division and institutions (language, planning, forward looking 
behavior). Humans have further been very effective in organizing war-like activities, thus being 
successful in cultural take-overs. Richerson and Boyd (2005) suggest that the propensity of 
humans to cooperate evolved through group selection processes. Cultural variation can more 
easily respond to group selection because cultural differences can be maintained even if there is 
substantial migration among groups (Cordes et al., 2008). The importance of interaction among 
cultural beliefs to cultural group selection is tested by Henrich (2007) and Boyd and Richerson 
(2002). Cultural group selection is likely to be or even have been more effective than its genetic 
counterpart (Cullen, 1995). 
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Biased social transmission is a dominant category of cultural acquisition and it may be 
important for cultural transmission between groups as well. Individuals are predisposed to adopt 
certain pre-existing cultural variants, and so these will increase in frequency. Boyd and 
Richerson (1985) distinguish three types: (1) content (or direct) bias, where the adoption of 
cultural variants depends on the properties (attractiveness) of the variants (e.g., food 
characteristics); (2) prestige (or indirect) bias, the imitation of certain characteristics (e.g., style 
of dress) perceived to be associated with others regarded as attractive (e.g., fame, wealth, 
happiness); and (3) frequency dependent bias, where imitation of the majority is dominant. The 
latter is also known as conformist transmission, a sort of rapid learning strategy which Henrich 
(2004) distinguishes from normative conformity, a strategy to avoid punishment and reap 
benefits of group membership. Content bias is more effective but involves more time and costs 
compared to the other two mechanisms. 
To understand the difference between cultural and genetic group selection, one should 
realize that whereas differential population growth is characteristic of both genetic and cultural 
group selection, horizontal (from peers) or oblique (from non-parental adults, such as teachers) 
transmission is typical for cultural acquiring but rare in genetic evolution. The reason is that 
cultural habits can be changed through imitation, so that there is no need to replace their 
carriers, while a change in genes requires that their carriers (vehicles) be replaced. 
Cultural group selection can build on the existence of institutions, leading to 
competition between, and thus selection of, institutions (Gürerk et al., 2006). This can be 
regarded as a proximate answer to many relevant research questions. An ultimate explanation of 
cultural group selection requires an explanation of the emergence of these institutions, which 
can be founded on genetic evolution, whether based in between-individual or between-group 
selection. To illustrate that institutions can support cultural group selection, note the role of 
organization within groups, taking the form of hierarchical control, legislation, and even 
representatives of groups interacting (negotiating) with each other. Institutions like social norms 
homogenize groups, which in turn may lead to polarization in a population consisting of 
multiple groups with distinct social norms. This increases the diversity of groups and possibly 
group conflict, both of which contribute to the effectiveness of group selection. Surprisingly, the 
human capacity for imitation plays an important role in creating diversity. Frequency-dependent 
imitation or conformist transmission is an important mechanism in this process: individuals 
adopt a behavior that is frequently observed. If cultural habits of dominant individuals differ 
among groups, groups will become very different while internally rather homogeneous 
(Henrich, 2004). Prestige-based transmission can have the same effect in terms of causing 
homogeneity within groups. It means that individuals copy the behavior of an individual they 
regard as successful. In larger societies, network and information externalities may do the same 
job as conformist transmission. In the jargon of evolutionary economics they cause a path-
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dependent development towards homogeneity within and diversity among groups (Arthur, 
1989). 
Henrich (2004, Section 6.2) discusses two other important mechanisms: punishment of 
non-conformists (norm violators) and normative conformity. The difference between normative 
conformity and conformist transmission is a subtle one: the outcomes can be the same, but as 
opposed to the first the latter is based on the idea that the majority is indicative of the best 
choice. A relative gain (relative benefits or welfare) may be involved when the absolute cost 
that goes along with punishing felt by the enforcer is lower than the absolute cost of being 
punished felt by the victim. This is consistent with the widely documented human interest in 
relative payoffs and well-being (Bruni and Porta, 2005). 
Various institutional mechanisms are responsible for creating group stability and 
replication. They can be seen as contributing to a kind of heritability at the level of groups, 
which enhances the effectiveness of group selection. For instance, the low direct fitness of 
individuals behaving altruistically is compensated by the social capacity to replicate pure 
altruism in subsequent generations, namely through social institutions and norms. This is 
reinforced by the existence of a meta-norm, the willingness to punish a person who did not 
enforce a particular norm (Axelrod, 1986). Norms are more stable under certain meta-norms. 
The fact that norms generate meta-norms can be regarded as an emergent property, or a new 
level in the multilevel evolutionary system of individuals, groups and group institutions and 
organization. Other mechanisms supporting a norm system are dominance, internalization, 
deterrence, social proof, membership, law and reputation. Persistent groups like religions are 
proof of the effectiveness of these mechanisms (Wilson, 2002). 
Next to selection one can identify innovation at the level of groups. Innovation may be 
more rapid (difficult to compare though in terms of a concrete indicator) in groups than 
individuals, especially since many (meme) innovations spring from complementarity, 
combination and cooperation. For example, conquest of one group by another can give rise to 
combinations of elements of two cultures that can lead to new group institutions. Apart from 
this, random cultural variation can occur, as cultural transmission involves ‘errors’ of various 
kinds. In fact, the rate of culturally transmitted errors is probably much higher than that in 
genetic mutation. ‘Institutional drift’ means that in small groups, cultural and institutional 
mutations may have a large impact, causing the respective culture to be less stable. Note the 
similarity with the biological notion of genetic or molecular drift. 
Once created, institutions can thus reinforce groups and support group selection effects 
along the line of group stability and inheritance, and between-group variation. Cultural variation 
can be created, maintained and enlarged through influencing offspring and immigrants from 
other groups. Certain groups adopt the more successful rules and habits of other groups. The 
intellectual capacity to learn, (re)search, understand, predict, and communicate in a 
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sophisticated way is required then, which in turn require the more fundamental capacity of 
empathy and language. Simon (1990, 1993) argues that given bounded rationality the evolution 
of a trait like docility, being sensitive to suggestions, persuasion and information by others, was 
logical and inevitable, especially in children but also in adults. This contributes to the 
effectiveness of institutions fostering group selection. 
A rare analysis of the role of institutions in a group selection context is Bowles et al. 
(2003). Their model allows for an analysis of the effect of two policies or institutions, namely 
resource sharing through a (linear) tax and a (uniform) redistribution scheme of tax revenues, 
and segmentation where individuals interact probabilistically with similar and other individuals 
(reflecting geographical organization or cultural dispositions). Numerical analyses show that 
these institutions can retard within-group selection against altruists. 
The separation between genetic or genetic and cultural group selection does not mean 
that these are independent. Genetic diversity is likely to indirectly affect cultural diversity (in a 
non-deterministic way) while cultural evolution (whether by between-group or between-
individual selection) affects genetic diversity of humans. Indeed, the history of human evolution 
arguably shows a subtle interaction between cultural and genetic evolution. The interaction 
between evolution through cultural transmission and differential population growth has been 
referred to as gene-culture coevolution and dual inheritance (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981; 
Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Richerson and Boyd, 2005). Cultural traits have an impact on the 
survival and reproduction, or the genetic fitness of individuals, and in turn are influenced by 
these. For instance, certain food habits include tastes that are not easily learned but must have 
been selected, as they are related to toxicity. Boyd and Richerson refer to this as natural 
selection of cultural variants. Dual transmission can explain the enlargement of differences 
among groups. Cultural evolution is based on cultural acquiring or learning. Economic 
institutions can be regarded as a specific type of ecological niche that influences the selection of 
individual traits, which gives rise to a coevolution of individual behavior and institutions 
(Bowles, 2000; van den Bergh and Stagl, 2003). Thompson (2000) notes that niche construction 
by a group that enhances its survival and growth is precisely a group feature that can be selected 
for through a process of group selection. Finally, Laland et al. (2000, p.131) have used the term 
“niche construction” to denote “the capacity of organisms to modify sources of natural selection 
in their environment”. Durham’s (1991) typology of gene-culture coevolution illustrates the 
interaction dynamics that may involve group selection effects. One can have coevolution with 
one population being guided by individual-level selection and the other by group (or multilevel) 
selection, but it is also possible that both populations are subject to multilevel selection. The 
resulting combination of multilevel and coevolution leads to a system with a degree of 
complexity that is beyond intuitive comprehension. 
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Finally, groups can change their composition and structure not only through genetic and 
cultural group selection but also through goal-oriented planning and control. The latter is of 
course an institution that itself has evolved over time, but contributes to non-evolutionary 
change once having come into existence. As a result, over a sufficiently long time period, 
cultural and economic change, whether occurring at individual or group levels, is likely to be a 
combination of evolution and non-evolutionary forces. In relation to this, the notion of “guided 
variation” (Boyd and Richerson, 1985) is relevant, denoting that humans can consciously and 
purposefully change their behavior, rules and norms through learning by doing (trial-and-error) 
and communication. This involves self-generation of alternatives.  
 
7. Some applications of cultural group selection in economics  
Here we outline themes in economics that can be linked to groups and group evolution. Our 
exposition is not meant to be complete in terms of coverage or description of specific research 
problems, questions and approaches, but merely to give an idea of the broad range of potentially 
interesting applications. 
 
The selection of organizational routines 
Nelson and Winter (1982) proposed the notion of routine as a property of an organization. A 
routine consists of a complex set of skilled individuals interacting simultaneously and 
sequentially. The interactions are crucial, and depend on earlier contacts (learning, adaptation) 
and organization-specific ‘language’. Organizational memory cannot simply be reduced to the 
sum of individual memories, and neither to blueprints. No single individual, including the 
‘boss’, possesses all the information to keep the organization running. The skills and 
communication experiences are not formally expressed, and the ‘boss’ may not even be aware 
of them, let alone be able to articulate them. If a routine breaks down it is not easy to restore, as 
it is the result of evolved cooperation, trust and mutual understanding. Therefore, organizational 
routines can be regarded as an emergent property of the group of individuals supporting it. The 
new employees are influenced to fit in the existing group so as to contribute its objectives. 
Changes in routines, and especially transitions from one to another routine, might be reframed 
as competition between, or selection of, routines seen as groups of individuals with 
complementary skills. The composition of a group will affect the performance of the related 
routine and thus affect the between-routine selection. At a higher level the competition between 
organizations can be seen as competition between group routines or sets of group routines in 
different organizations. Hodgson and Knutson (2007) stress the importance of group cohesion 
as a condition for group selection to occur, whether in the case of selecting  “routines” or “social 
positions.” Transferring ideas from group selection theory and models to this area might lead to 
new conceptualizations, insights and formal models, with possibly a better understanding of 
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how interactions of employees in a firm translate into firm performance, dynamics and 
interaction with its environment, including competition with other firms. This would imply a 
much-needed multi-level approach to the study of the firm. An interesting question would be 
how within-group selection (of employees) and between-group selection (i.e. between routines, 
or between firms) combine: which selection type dominates under what conditions: type and 
size of firm and market, presence of regulation, consumer behavior and public opinion?  
 Group or multilevel selection allows opening the black box of routines, and describing 
simultaneously the dynamics of individuals within routines, and of groups of individuals that 
form or generate routines. Nelson and Winter implicitly note the multilevel nature of the firm, 
by recognizing that routines are complex sets or groups of skilled individuals interacting 
simultaneously and sequentially. Admittedly, the available group selection approaches may fall 
short in certain respects or might require molding to become more suitable for the current 
context. For instance, they emphasize similar rather than complementary behaviors, while 
routines depend very much on labor division and specialized tasks. But the latter features are not 
inconsistent with group selection. It should further be noted that groups can be interactors in the 
process of selection of individuals (Hull, 1980) or an adapting entity themselves (Lloyd, 2005). 
Although application of group selection to routines may be seen to emphasize the latter role, 
inevitably routine (group) selection will affect selection of individuals (or their characteristics) 
within routines, which in turn will affect the fitness of routines.10 Such a multilevel evolutionary 
perspective may enrich Nelson and Winter’s basic framework. 
 
The selection of institutions and organizational structures
 
Whereas the previous example focused on organizational routines, organisational group 
selection in the economy can also give rise to changes in the frequency of certain organizational 
structures. Defining features are size, hierarchical structure, ownership/control separation, 
horizontal/vertical structure (departments, matrix) and spatial structure (geographically 
separated sub-units). The evolutionary approach to understanding organizations developed by 
Hannan and Freeman (1989) is relevant here. It employs two theories of organizational change 
that involve adaptation. The first, referred to as selection (population adaptation) theories, is 
based on the idea that variety arises mainly from new organizations. Existing organizations 
adopt a certain structure very early in their life and rarely change it, since they are not flexible 
                                                          
10
 Lloyd (2005) takes the literature on the levels and units of selection as a starting point to clarify group 
selection. She identifies four fundamental questions: (1) The interactor question: what units are being 
actively selected in a process of natural selection? Linked to group selection, this requires identifying the 
conditions under which group selection influences the evolution of individuals. (2) The replicator 
question: which organic entities actually meet the definition of replicator? (3) The beneficiary question: 
who (individual, group) benefits from multilevel evolution, in the short run (adaptations) and in the long 
term (ultimate beneficiary species, lineages or alleles)? (4) The manifestor-of-adaptation question: at what 
level(s) do adaptations occur or what is the entity (individual, group or both) that does the adapting? 
Page 29 of 44
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 28
but rigid. As a result, major innovations in organizational structure and strategy occur early in 
the life cycle of firms and sectors. Adaptation occurs at the population level, which involves the 
founding of new organizations and the demise of old, non-adapted organisations. The second 
type, (individual) adaptation theories, starts from the idea that individual organizations respond 
and adapt to environmental changes, threats and opportunities by adapting their strategy and 
structure. The largest and oldest organizations therefore have superior capacity for survival 
(selection). Market and firm demography studies show that there is a large variation in 
organizational structures (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Carroll and Hannan, 2000). 
Organizational evolution means a change in forms, elements and connections. In addition, it can 
involve reallocating resources, or even splitting off parts. This can be a useful strategy if group 
size becomes too large. It can be seen as a special case of group selection. More generally, 
groups of activities might work together and compete in this way with others. Thus selection of 
organizations can involve group selection. In addition, selection among routines in separate 
organizations might receive attention, which connects with the previously discussed theme.  
Somewhat in the spirit of Hayek (1976), the evolutio  of institutions can also be 
understood as resulting from group competition (Gürerk et al, 2005), although the traditional 
evolutionary focus is on individual-level processes (Hodgson, 2004). If institutions are strongly 
connected to specific groups, then dominance or convergence of institutions may result from 
competition between those groups. This is an alternative to the dominant view in economics to 
regard institutions as the result of purposeful planning and policy making. Diffusion and 
disappearance of institutions due to group selection is an idea especially relevant to understand 
social-economic history. Indeed, the latter can be characterized by local economies and groups 
competing for scarce space, resources, market demand, and political power. An application of 
particular group selection assumptions, extended with insights from institutional economics on 
the emergence and intrinsic dynamics of institutions (van den Bergh and Stagl, 2003), may 
clarify features of, and changes in, economic institutions. Other lines of research might address 
the interaction of interest groups, the competition of political parties for members and voters, 
and the emergence of international institutions resulting from coalitions (such multilateral 
agreements on environment, trade and human rights).  
 
Public decision making and other-regarding behavior 
Mainstream economics, whether based on neoclassical economics or public choice theory, casts 
public institutions in a static choice framework with given input data on options and 
preferences. Neoclassical economics, implicitly or explicitly, aggregates all preferences into a 
single social welfare function, despite the fact that Arrow (1951) showed such an aggregation is 
impossible. Public choice theory adds more complexity and detail by allowing for multiple 
stakeholders, leading to game theoretical conceptualizations at the level of groups.  
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Of course, it is easy to circumvent or solve Arrow's paradox. For example, one has to 
step outside the static model boundaries and take into account that individuals are other-
regarding, communicate within groups, deliberate and influence each other, and are sensitive to 
group norms. This process is dynamic, not static, and it is therefore no surprise that evolutionary 
theories have been invoked to understand it (Wohlgemuth, 2002). Groups compete for public 
attention and support, which influences public choices. This suggests a role for group selection 
in the analysis of public decision making. However, public choice theory has not addressed the 
multilevel nature of this problem. Individuals interact within groups, the composition of these 
groups changes over time, leaders change and leadership changes as a result, having impact on 
coordinated efforts within and thus performance of the group. In turn, this will affect the 
competition between, or selection of groups – whether interest groups or political parties. A 
group selection perspective might better deal with the upward and downward causality that 
characterizes political and public decision-making systems, and thus offer a better tool for 
understanding political dynamics. 
 
Rationality, markets, crowding out of social norms and public policy 
The economic theory of public policy is dominated by the assumption of ‘rational agents’ and a 
strong focus on monetary incentives. Group theories convey the message that it is not just 
rational for humans to make decisions as social beings, but it is an essential characteristic of our 
species. Likewise, incentives for individual action are socially constructed and include a gamut 
of positive and negative enforcement mechanisms. Bowles (1998) emphasizes that group 
selection is moreover an important alternative to retaliation, reputation and segmentation in 
understanding innovation and diffusion of socially desirable traits of human behavior. Effective 
policies should reckon with these foundations (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Gowdy, 2004).  
A group perspective on the dominance of market-based economies, diffused through 
deliberate pleas by politicians and economists, provides a number of refreshing insights. Bowles 
and Gintis (2002, p.F422), in discussing the benefits of community structure, note that 
“communities solve problems that might otherwise appear as classic market failures or state 
failures: namely, insufficient provision of local public goods such as neighborhood amenities, 
the absence of insurance and other risk-sharing opportunities even when these would be 
mutually beneficial, exclusion of the poor from credit markets, and excessive and ineffective 
monitoring of work effort.” One might add monitoring of norms and lack of anonymity that is 
the cause of so much urban crime. This is consistent with a statement by K.J. Arrow (cited in 
Bowles and Gintis, 2002): “norms of social behaviour … (may be) … reactions of society to 
compensate for market failures”. Indeed, perhaps social behaviour should be better exploited by 
public policies. Examples are promoting desired behaviour by offering rewards (creating status) 
and widely diffusing information about exemplatory cases and individuals, for instance, 
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regarding successful energy conservation by households or energy innovation by firms in the 
face of risks posed by climate change (Nannen and van den Bergh, 2009). 
An issue which also deserves attention here is the crowding out of certain types of 
socially desirable behaviour by individuals (social or group norms) by monetization of values in 
markets and specific legislation (Fehr, 2002; Frey, 1997; Frey and Oberholtzer-Gee, 1997; 
Polanyi, 1944; Vatn and Bromley, 1994; Vohs et al., 2006). Such crowding out is more effective 
in markets characterized by ephemeral and anonymous (as opposed to durable and personal) 
interactions between economic agents and by low entry and exit costs. According to Bowles 
(2008, 1605) the unintended effects of economic incentives “occur because people act not only 
to acquire economic goods and services but also to constitute themselves as dignified 
autonomous and moral individuals.” Economic incentives can undermine group selected norms 
that promote the social good. 
 
Group selection and common pool dilemmas 
Various communities around the world are involved in what has been called self-organization in 
the context of common pool dilemmas (Ostrom, 1990). So far, no group selection argument has 
been used in this literature, although the evolution of institutions has received ample attention in 
the context of common-pool resources (Noailly et al., 2007, 2009; Sethi and Somanathan, 
1996). A central question is whether resource conflicts and overuse should be addressed by 
strict policies set by higher-level governments, or instead by relying on the endogenous 
formation of use regimes. Case study research and evolutionary reasoning show that externally 
imposed rules and monitoring can destabilize cooperation (Ostrom, 2000). Under imperfect 
monitoring, external regulation may be undesirable as it will be ineffective and even harm the 
self-organisation process underlying the emergence of norms. With the presence of groups, self-
organization may becomes more effective, as multiple experiments are done in different groups, 
and the most successful one can spread to the other groups – a form of group selection. Boyd 
and Richerson’s (1990) finding (see section 5) suggests that in the case of a problem 
characterized by multiple stable equilibria (MSE) group selection may act as an equilibrium 
selection mechanism. On the negative side, groups competition might be fiercer than 
competition among individuals, with possibly negative consequences for resource sustainability. 
These are interesting issues for research, which could involves studying the role of group size, 
within-group heterogeneity and hierarchy, conformism or imitation, social norms, punishment, 
and the effect of external regulation on multilevel selection. Further, the effect of the type of 
interactions between individuals and groups might be examined, such as downstream effects 
(unidirectional), extended (complex) networks and merely neighboring contacts. 
 
 
Page 32 of 44
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 31
Group selection and socioeconomic power  
‘Power’ is a central idea in other social sciences, but it is almost completely lacking in 
economics. The important exception is market power, the ability to deliberately influence 
prices. However, in general the notion of power lacks a convincing theoretical framework. An 
important reason is that mainstream economics relies on the notion of representative agent, and 
so ignores groups and related power issues. In line with this, there is no agreement on 
definitions and indicators of power in the literature (Herrmann-Pillath, 2004). Possibly, the most 
important theory in economics that bears a direct relation to power is principal-agent theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It describes a principal and an agent with different objectives and 
information sets, which is a cause of moral hazard. Things get more complex if it is recognized 
that firms function on the basis of interactions between groups (as suggested in relation to the 
foregoing themes ‘routines’ and ‘organizations’). In fact, some of the complications have 
already been studied, using multiple agents and principals (Dosi et al., 2003). However, these 
frameworks still neglect the specific features of groups. 
Since power is scarce (a kind of zero-sum game) it is eco omically relevant in multiple 
ways. Moreover, recognizing that power involves control over, or influence on, groups, means 
that a setting of multiple groups and their interactions offers a potentially useful starting point 
for a general conceptualization, formalization and analysis of power.  Power can further be 
linked to historical contingencies, vested interests and positive feedback operating through 
increasing returns to scale, which suggests the relevance of the evolutionary notions of path-
dependence and lock-in. 
Power also plays a role at the level of politics and public policy. In the context of 
complex public issues, often multiple groups emerge around specific (vested) interests. Relevant 
groups considered in public choice theories are politicians, public officers (‘bureaucrats’), firms, 
ngo’s and consumers. However, the specific group features of each of these are not addressed.. 
Such interest groups can be regarded as the result of assortment, leading to quite homogeneous 
groups and sometimes polarization or large variety and even conflict at the group level. 
Polarization is a clear phenomenon in politics. Group selection is capable of describing the 
strategic and unintended interactions between the various groups and the formation and role of 
power. 
Finally, in a modern society, groups compete for the attention and (financial) support of 
individuals. This involves advertisement and strategic information provision. Using group 
selection theory to study power realized through such means may deliver interesting insights 
about the impact of information provision and lessons for regulating advertisement. For a more 
complete and systematic discussion of power in relation to group selection see Safarzynska and 
van den Bergh (2009). 
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8. Summary and conclusions 
The above discussion highlights the richness of evolutionary thinking about groups and group 
dynamics. Such thinking implies a multilevel analytical approach, comprised of individuals and 
groups as well as the interactions among them. Humans possess a large capacity for other-
regarding behavior, sophisticated communication, cultural transmission and social organization, 
as well as a tendency to behave in a parochial manner. All these contribute to the effectiveness 
of group selection processes. Humans show cooperation and altruism in much larger groups 
than most other mammals, further supporting the potential relevance of group selection for 
understanding human behavior.  
Genetic group selection is now regarded as theoretically feasible, and it is supported by 
a large number of experimental and empirical studies. Cultural group selection is more 
controversial but potentially more relevant for human societies, since cultural evolution operates 
over shorter time spans. Cultural and genetic evolution, both at individual and group levels, may 
interact, leading to gene-culture coevolution. Cultural group selection is a process in which 
horizontal cultural transmission dominates – as opposed to (predominantly vertical) genetic 
transmission in genetic group selection. Whereas genetic transmission normally requires 
replacement of the carrier of the gene(s), cultural transmission can work in two ways: imitation 
of others, and replacement of individual carriers of cultural habits. Simplifying a bit, one can 
further distinguish between kin, reciprocal, and group selection, and say that kin selection is 
relevant to family groups, reciprocity to medium-sized groups where everyone knows each 
other, and cultural group selection comes into play in larger groups.11 
Economists can learn much from the group selection literature, recognizing that care 
must be taken when transferring ideas and concepts from one discipline to another. We have 
sketched some possible applications of group selection and posed some research questions 
within the field of economics. A consequence of describing economic systems at both individual 
and group levels is that upward and downward causation are combined, leading to a ‘multilevel 
economics’ rather than a “microfoundations” approach (only upward causation). Evolutionary 
thinking has become an accepted approach in economics – witness the regular appearance of 
evolutionary game theory in mainstream economics journals. But the overemphasis on 
parsimony in modeling and analysis by focusing on one (between individuals) selection level, is 
unnecessarily restrictive. A structurally complete evolutionary model needs to reckon with the 
possibility of group selection effects.  
                                                          
11
 Koopmans (2006) adds the notions of group and missionary altruism. Group altruism reflects the 
effects of genetic and cultural group selection, while missionary altruism denotes the case where altruism 
increases the benefactor’s receptiveness to the (often unintended) cultural message of the donor. 
Koopmans (p. 17) explains the cultural success of the missionary strategy as: “the missionary is an 
emblem of success and as such he is a virulent source of contagion for cultural imitation – from the pipe 
that he smokes to the God that he worships.” Henrich and Boyd (1998) capture this phenomenon under 
the more general notion of ‘biased cultural transmission’. 
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We reviewed the main mechanisms of genetic and cultural group selection and how 
group selection might function in economic settings. We discussed the role of migrant pool 
versus propagule, non-random assortment, spatial population structures, institutions, group 
conflict, groupishness, and non-additive (genetic or behavioral) interaction between individuals. 
Some of these factors have received more attention in modeling than others, while no model 
captures all of them. An unsolved problem is how to empirically or experimentally distinguish 
between them.  
Current group selection models have mainly addressed altruism (mostly in PD games) 
and the evolution of biased sex-ratios. We argue that these do not exhaust the range of possible 
alternative evolutionary settings. Empirical and experimental studies suggest that group 
selection can foster survival strategies beyond the limitations of between-individual selection. 
Group selection requires interdependent individual entities, such as non-additive genetic or 
cultural interaction or other-regarding behavior – not just altruistic actions but also envy, status-
seeking or any other social interaction. Finally, group selection effects may be dominated by 
other types of effects, such as repeated game types of phenomena (reciprocity, and indirect 
reputation and reputation) and costly punishment. However, when repeated games do not well 
describe the evolutionary problem at hand, it should be recognized that the latter solution, costly 
punishment, creates a second-order free rider problem. This in turn requires invoking 
explanations like conformism, signaling, meta-norms and group-selection. 
In this paper we indicated a range of themes and research questions that might benefit 
from invoking (cultural) group selection thinking. In particular, we mentioned the selection of 
organizational routines, the selection of organizational structures, the crowding out of group 
norms by markets, design of regulation and legislation, the role of group selection in common 
pool dilemmas, using group selection to better understand the notion of socioeconomic power, 
and the evolution of institutions through group competition. In applying group selection to 
socio-economic phenomena, specific problems will have to be addressed. For example, what 
does the simultaneous participation of individuals in modern societies in multiple, overlapping 
groups imply for the effectiveness of group selection? And how important is conflict versus 
assortment? In addition, existing concepts and insights regarding the functions, composition and 
formation of groups from economics, sociology and social psychology may have to be included 
to increase the relevance of applications of group selection theories to economics. This may 
ultimately lead to a multilevel approach to economic evolution.  
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Table 1. Factors determining the effectiveness of group selection 
 
Factor Negative if present Positive if present  
Population structure 
and dynamics 
 
Migrant pool  (temporary  
     groups) 
Migration 
Propagule pool (permanent, separate  
     groups) 
(Non-random) assorting. 
Endogenous splitting of groups 
Among-group diversity Small 
Initially random 
Historically large 
Initially non-random (e.g., assorting) 
Spatial structure 
 
 
 Spatial isolation 
Local interaction 
Spatial clustering/assorting 
Selection pressure 
 
 Direct interaction among groups, 
Group conflict 
Biased cultural transmission 
 
Individual interaction  Genetic or behavioral 
independence 
     of individuals 
Non-additive (genetic) interaction  
     between individuals (in a group) and  
     cultural interaction between  
     individuals (institutions) increase  
     group differences 
Group coherence Weak internal group relations  
Migrant pool 
Stable group, Propagule pool 
Strong internal relationships 
Group i stitutions (norms, punish,  
     reward, sharing) 
Unique communication/signals  
     (chemical, language, cultural habits) 
Groupishness Groupish free riders  Assortment of groupish altruists 
Group size Large group size negative as it 
      hampers genetic or cultural  
     drift, and may involve costs 
      (anonymity, communication, 
      coordination, monitoring,  
      compliance) 
Large size positive if synergy of  
     (complementary) individual traits  
     (e.g., labour division) 
Small group may allow  for spatial  
     isolation and random (genetic or  
     cultural) drift 
 
